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THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION
ACT: CONSTITUTIONALITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS
Foryears, the law has done little to prevent parentsfacing unfavorable child
custody decreesfrom abducting their children and taking them across state lines.
This Note asserts that the law has actually encouragedthispractice because traditionalrequirementsforpersonaljurisdiction
permit more than one state to determine
custody of the children. In addition,state courts refuse to recognize the childcustody
decrees ofsisterstates and often issue conflicting decreesfavoringthe abductingparent. Congress recently attempted to remedy the problem by passing the Parental
Kidnapping PreventionAct. The PKPA imposes uniform personaljurisdictionrequirementsupon the states which permit only one state to determine child custody,
and it requires state courts to recognize the child custody decrees of other states.
This Note concludesthat the PKPA is a constitutionallypermissibleexercise ofcongressionalpower which will eliminate the court-imposedimpediments to reducing
interstatechild abductions.

INTRODUCTION
INTERSTATE CHILD abduction by parents facing divorce or
separation has been an unchecked and serious domestic relations
problem.' A child's welfare is jeopardized by any unstable custody arrangement, and catastrophic consequences are a likely result of the child's abduction by one parent from the other.2
Although the courts strive to ensure the child's best interests, 3 the
1. See, e.g., Note, Prevention of ChildStealing: The Needfor a NationalPolicy, 11
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 829, 830 (1978); Gardner, Missing Children: New Laws Sought, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1982, § XI, at 4, col. 5; Gardner, Missing Children: Legal Thicket, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1982, § XI, at I, col. 1; Wels, New York's Default on 'Child-Napping"N.Y.
Times, Feb. 13, 1981, at 26, col. 6 (letter to the editor).

2. H.
(1968).
states:

CLARKE, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

326

Emphasizing the detrimental effects child custody can have on children, Clark

One of the things that the child's welfare certainly demands is stability and
regularity. If he is continually being transferred from one parent to the other by
conflicting court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with one
parent, even though as an original proposition some better provision could have
been made for him. The necessary stability can only be achieved by a great respect on the part of the courts for existing custody decrees, and a lessening of their
tendency to assume that their own disposition of a case is preferable to another's.
Not only will this insure greater adherence to decrees by the courts of other states,
but it will discourage parents from attempting to reitigate their custody disputes,
and from using their child as a weapon for hurting each other.
Id.
3. See Bodenheimer, The UCCJA: A4Legislative Remedyfor Children Caught in the
Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1210-11 (1969) (citing Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S.
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current legal framework does little to ameliorate the problem,4 because state courts do not give full faith and credit to custody orders of other states.5 The resulting availability of random and
conflicting custody orders makes interstate child abduction less
hazardous-and may indeed encourage it. A parent receiving an
unfavorable custody decree in one state may take an abducted
child across state lines hoping to obtain a favorable decree in another state. A new federal law mandating strict jurisdictional
standards, however, will reduce interstate parental child abduc-

tions by severely limiting a state's power to issue a conflicting custody order.6
Until recently, reducing interstate child abductions by elimi-

nating conflicting child custody orders has been a difficult task,
because such orders are not final decisions entitled to full faith
and credit.7 Initially, states applied the comity doctrine8 in an effort to minimize the fluid nature of child custody decrees, but the
187, 193 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958)); Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1969) (discussion of psychological best interests of the child test).
4. See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text; see also Hazard, May v. Anderson:
Preambleto Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959) (analysis of destructive effects
upon family law, special protection of neglected children, and social control of juvenile
delinquency caused by Supreme Court's prohibiting enforcement of Wisconsin custody decree by Ohio court).
5. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
7. Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Casefor the Uniform
Child Custody JurisdictionalAct, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011 (1977). Noting the leniency given
to child custody modification, the authors state:
Although the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution mandates interstate recognition of sister state decrees, and has no proviso limiting its operation
to "final" decrees, a condition of finality has nonetheless been judicially imposed.
Decrees and orders relating to child custody and visitation (and also child support) are invariably subject to modification owing to a change of circumstances
and hence are nonfinal in that sense. Moreover, since the first forum may modify,
it is permissible for a second forum to do so without violating any full faith and
credit obligation.
Id. at 1012-13.
8. See, e.g., Bergen v. Bergen, 439 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1971) (principles of comity
applied in custody determination); Beebe v. Chavez, 226 Kan. 591, 602 P.2d 1279 (1979)
(court refused to modify custody determination because of comity); Walden v. Johnson,
417 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1967) (doctrine of comity applied to enforce child custody decree);
Bachelor v. District Court of Creek County, 593 P.2d 84 (Okla. 1978) (child custody decree
enforced on a matter of comity). "Comity" is defined as:
Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter
of right, but out of deference and goodwill. . . . In general, principle of"comity"
is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of
deference and mutual respect.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

242 (5th ed. 1979).
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doctrine was not uniformly applied by the states.9 The dilemma
intensified because the Supreme Court refused to decide whether
child custody orders are entitled to full faith and credit under the
United States Constitution.' 0
Recently, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA)"t was offered as a response to the Supreme Court's failure to provide workable guidelines, but it has not proven to be

completely effective. 12 Congress' latest response to the recognized
solution is the Parental Kidneed for a comprehensive, national
3

napping Prevention Act (PKPA).1

This Note analyzes the PKPA, beginning with a discussion of

the developments which led to the recognition that national legis-

lation was needed to combat parental child abductions.1 4 This
discussion includes a summary of the current Supreme Court po-

sition, 5 an overview of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, '6 the specific legislative history of the PKPA, 17 and a description of the Act as passed.'" The Note then considers whether the
PKPA is a constitutionally permissible exercise of Congress'
power under the commerce clause and under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Finally, the Note evaluates the Act's effec-

tiveness in deterring interstate child abductions by applying the
principles of the Act to past Supreme Court cases dealing with
9. See, e.g., Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 246,41 N.W.2d 60 (1950) (doctrine of comity not applicable to child custody determination); In re Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W.
876 (1888) (comity not considered in custody determination); People ex rel. Van Dyk v.
Van Dyk, 33 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (doctrine of comity not applied in child custody
case); In re Price, 528 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1974) (doctrine of comity not applicable to child
custody determination). In each of these cases, the court did not apply comity principles
because the child's circumstances changed after the original custody decree was rendered.
These cases underscore the basic problem with using the comity doctrine. The comity doctrine does not obligate the states to recognize foreign state laws and judicial decisions.
Comity, therefore, is subject to case-by-case application-a method inherently subjective
and disjointed.
10. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
11. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
12. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
13. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94
Stat. 3568-73 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655, 663
(Supp. IV 1980)); see infra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 72-146 and accompanying text.
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child custody disputes.2"
I.

PKPA:

HISTORY AND MOTIVATION

The Supreme Court has been reluctant to decide whether the
full faith and credit clause constitutionally applies to child custody orders.2 But neither has the Court expressly held that child
custody orders are not entitled to full faith and credit.22
In Halvey v. Halvey,2 3 the Court initially considered the effect
which a state must give to a child custody order of another state,
and concluded that res judicata does not apply to a custody decree
despite an apparent constitutional mandate of full faith and
credit.2 4 The Court held that any foreign state may modify a custody decree to the same extent that a rendering state may do so, if
the foreign state possesses the requisite jurisdiction. This decision marked the beginning of the Court's continuing effort to reconcile child custody orders with notions of res judicata and
personal jurisdiction.
When confronted with the issue of personal jurisdiction in
May v. Anderson,26 the Supreme Court held that a custody decree
is invalid unless the rendering court has personal jurisdiction over
both parents. In May, the Court determined that a Wisconsin custody decree obtained by the husband could not be enforced because the wife and children were living in Ohio.2 7 May v.
Anderson has been criticized because the strict in personam jurisdiction requirement encourages parental abduction,2 8 while ignoring the impact custody battles have on children.2 9
Five years later, in Kovacs v. Brewer,30 the Court held that a
state court need not give res judicata effect to the original foreign
state custody decree when changed circumstances necessitate
modification. 3 The case was remanded solely to determine
20. See infra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
21. Frank, The End of Legal Kidnapping in Pennsylvania: The Development of a Decided Public Policy, 25 VILL. L. REv. 784, 796 (1980).
22. Id.; UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9
U.L.A. at 112 (1979).
23. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
24. Id. at 615.
25. Id. at 614.
26. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
27. Id. at 528-29.
28. See Hazard, supra note 4.
29. See H. CLARKE, supra note 2, at 324; supra text accompanying note 2.
30. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
31. Id. at 608.
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whether a change in circumstances had actually occurred. The
Court again failed to give child custody orders the apparent constitutionally mandated full faith and credit.
Finally, in Ford v. Ford,3 2 the Court held that even if the full
faith and credit clause is applicable to child custody cases, a state

court is not bound by a foreign state court's dismissal of a custody
dispute, if the dismissal was not a final decision in the rendering
state.3 3 Emphasizing again that the children's best interests are

paramount, 34 the Court stated that the trial judge's failure
to re35

view the custody agreement prevents a final dismissal.
The Supreme Court thus has not provided concrete guidelines
for states to use in determining the effect to be given to a valid
custody order rendered by another state. The Court's failure to

recognize the need for full faith and credit makes such orders
practically ineffective.
The Supreme Court's inaction has prompted commentators to
emphasize the need for uniform state action. 36 The Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 37 was drafted to meet
that need. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws noted that the UCCJA's enactment was a response to the Supreme Court's failure to settle the question of full
38
faith and credit applicability to custody decrees.

The conceptual basis of the UCCJA is Professor Ratner's "established home principle" of custody jurisdiction. 39 The established home principle confines child custody jurisdiction to one
32. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 193.
35. Id. at 194.
36. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, The Rights of Childrenand the Crisis in Custody Litigatiorn
Aodflcation of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. CoLo. L. Rnv. 495 (1975); Ehrenzweig,
Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345 (1953) (uniform policy
will reduce unending litigation of interstate child custody issues and allow for clearer and
more predictable decisions).
37. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
38. Id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. at 112. The UCCJA's legal purpose
is to create uniform exercise of state child custody jurisdiction in the absence of Supreme
Court action mandating full faith and credit for child custody decrees. Id. at 114. The
Commissioners, however, also acknowledge that the UCCJA serves a humanitarian function. The UCCJA's prefatory remarks clearly recognize that children caught within custody battles are deprived of security and stability deemed essential to their emotional
growth and future well-being. Id. at 112. The Commissioners hoped that the UCCJA
would eliminate the tragic consequences of parental child abductions. See id. at 113-14.
39. See Ratner, Child Custody in a FederalSystem, 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964). The
established home principle bases custody jurisdiction on the child's relationship with the
state. Proper jurisdiction exists only if the child has been physically present in the state for
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state,4 ° the goal being to make custody orders less indecisive and
uncertain. 4 '
Although the UCCJA generated considerable optimism, it did

not produce a comprehensive solution.42 It has been criticized for
the lack of effective sanctions to enforce the Act if it is violated.4 3

Criticism also focuses upon judicial interpretations expanding opportunities for jurisdiction in more than one state.' Finally, the
Act does not contain any means to locate an abducting parent or
punish such people to deter future violations.4 5 Recent efforts,
therefore, have focused upon resolving interstate custody disputes
through federal legislation.
The first federal legislative attempt to mandate full faith and
credit to child custody orders was introduced in the House of Representatives, and passed as a rider to the Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1980.46 In the Senate, an amendment
a minimum period of time. The child's physical presence gives the state both control over
and an interest in the child's welfare. Id. at 815-23.
40. Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the Interstate ChildCustody Problem: A Reply to
Professor Currieand a Proposed Uniform Act, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1965). Ratner's
theory contrasts with the multijurisdictional approach advanced by Professor Currie. The
multijurisdictional approach permits concurrent state jurisdiction because the child's domicile, the child's presence in the state, and personal jurisdiction over the parents serve as
alternative jurisdictional bases. See Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 780, 197
P.2d 739, 750 (1948).
Although Professor Currie envisions a different solution to child custody problems than
Ratner, he also views the Supreme Court position as unfavorable. See Currie, Full Faith
and Credit Chiefly to Judgments.- A Rolefor Congress 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89, 115.
41. Ratner criticizes the multijurisdictional approach by emphasizing the utility of the
single jurisdictional approach to child custody orders:
A state where the defendant is domiciled, resident or personally served may
make or modify a custody decree. A decree may also be modified by a state
requested to enforce it and perhaps by the state that initially made it. The protection afforded a custody decree by the full faith and credit clause is uncertain.
Ratner, supra note 39, at 807.
42. Foster & Freed, supra note 7; Hudak, Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts, 39 Mo. L. REv. 521, 542-47 (1974);
Note, supra note 1. One previous problem was that the UCCJA's effectiveness depended
upon the number of states that adopted it. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT,

Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. at 114; Bodenheimer, The Uniform ChildCustody
JurisdictionAct, 3 FAM. L.Q. 304 (1969); Fleck, Child Snatching by Parents: What Legal
Remediesfor "FleaandPlea"?,55 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 303, 309 (1979). That problem seems
to have been resolved since 48 states have now adopted the UCCJA. See P. HOFF, J.
SCHULMAN, A.

VOLENICK & J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND

POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAWS app. III (1982).
43. Note, supra note 1, at 840-41. Contempt proceedings for violating a child custody
order are ineffective if the abducting parent leaves the state court's jurisdiction. Id.
44. Hudak, supra note 42, at 547; Note, supra note 1, at 857.
45. Note, supra note 1, at 858-59.
46. H.R. 1977, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The Act was passed by the House in 1979,
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING:
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proposed by Senator Wallop, entitled the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act,47 was added by the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources.48 The Wallop Amendment advocated full
faith and credit treatment of child custody orders in language vir-

tually identical to that employed in the UCCJA.4 9 The full Senate
passed its version of the Domestic Violence Act containing the
Wallop Amendment.5 0 Although the Conference Committee de-

clined to make parental kidnapping a separate federal crime, it
did modify the Wallop Amendment by permitting the Justice Department to use an already existing federal criminal statute 5 to
facilitate state prosecution of parental kidnapping. 2 The House
passed the Conference Report Version of the Domestic Violence
Prevention and Services Act,5 3 but the Senate tabled it on November 17, 1980.14
An attempt later that year was more successful. The Senate
passed5" the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as an amendment to an unrelated bill.56 The new legislation contained the
same Wallop Amendment that had been revised by the Conference Committee to the Domestic Violence Act.5 7 The House concurred in the Senate amendment, 5 8 and the bill became law on
December 28, 1980.11
The general purpose of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
and was referred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 126 CONG.
REc. S12051, 12066 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1980).
47. S. 105, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
48. 126 CONG. REc. S12051, 12061 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1980).
49. Compare Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) with UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a), 9
U.L.A. 122 (1979). The jurisdiction and full faith and credit requirements of the Wallop
Amendment include the same language as the PKPA. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
50. 126 CONG. REC. S12051, 12066 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1980).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (Supp. IV 1980); see also infra notes 118-22 and accompanying
text.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1401, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980).
53. 126 CONG. REc. H10400 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1980).
54. 126 CONG. REC. S14547 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1980).
55. 126 CONG. REC. S16506 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980).
56. H.R. 8406 provided medical coverage for administering pneumococcal vaccine to
the elderly. 126 CONG. REC. HI 1673 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980).
57. 126 CONG. REC. S16506-07 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980).
58. Id. at H12940 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980), reported in 126 CONG. REC. H12497 (daily
ed. Dec. 15, 1980).
59. 126 CONG. REC. 12553 (daily ed. Dec. 30, 1980). H.R. 8406 was approved by
President Carter on December 28, 1980. The full faith and credit legislation (see infra note
110 and accompanying text) found in § 8(a) is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV
1980).
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Act (PKPA) is to "promote cooperation among the states in the
enforcement of custody and visitation orders, discourage continuing interstate controversies and conflicts, and deter interstate abductions of children. ' 60 The formal purposes as set forth by
Congress are contained in section 7(c) of the Act. 6 1 Formal congressional findings used as the basis for the enactment of the Pa-

rental Kidnapping Prevention Act are set forth in section 7(a) of
the Act. 62 The measure responded to "current judicial interpreta-

tion of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution whereby
child custody orders are rendered almost unenforceable through63
out the nation.
60. H.R. REP. No. 1401, supra note 52, at 41.
61. Section 7(c) provides that the PKPA will:
(I) promote cooperation between State courts ....
(2) promote and expand the exchange of information. . . between States ....
(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of sister
States. ..
(4) discourage continuing interestate controversies over child custody ....
(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts ....
(6) deter interstate abductions. . . of children undertaken to obtain custody and
visitation awards.
94 Stat. 3568, 3569. These stated purposes match those found in § 1 of the UCCJA, 9
U.L.A. at 117, with the exception of purposes 3, 6, and 9 of the UCCJA which are not
expressly included in the PKPA:
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily in
the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal
relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the
exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection
with another state ...
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as
feasible ...
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
Id. at 117. It is possible that incorporating these purposes into the PKPA is unnecessary
since these purposes are subsumed by establishing uniform state jurisdictional standards
for child custody decrees and directing that states give full faith and credit to foreign state
custody decrees. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (Supp. IV 1980); see also infra note 110 and accompanying text.
62. 94 Stat. 3566 at 3568-3569. Section 7(a) provides in part:
(1) there. . . [are] disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation... ;
(2) the laws and practices ..
are often inconsistent and conflicting;
(3) the law and practice contribute to . . . seizure, restraint, concealment, and
interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court orders, excessive relitigation of cases, obtaining of conflicting orders . . . and interestate travel and
communication that is so expensive and time consuming as to disrupt occupations
and commercial activities;
(4) among the results . . . are the failure to give full faith and credit to judicial
proceedings . . . the deprivation of rights of liberty and property without due
process. . . burdens on commerce.
their parents . . ..

. . and harm to the welfare of children and

Id.
63.

126 CONG. REC. S12061 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1980) (remarks by Sen. Humphrey); see

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

The PKPA sets up a four-part scheme in seeking to fulfill its
formal purposes. First, the Act directs states to give full faith and
credit to valid foreign state custody decrees.' Second, it expands
the services available under the Federal Parent Locator Service to
provide for a national system for locating parents and children.6 5
The Locator Service was established originally to locate parents
obligated to pay child support.6 6 Third, the Act 67 expands the Fu-

gitive Felon Act, 68 used only with the Attorney General's approval, which aids enforcement of existing state parental
kidnapping felony laws. 69 Finally, the Act adopts the language of
the UCCJA in establishing national standards for determining
proper state jurisdiction over child custody orders.7 °
The congressional findings listed in section 7(a) indicate that

Congress enacted the PKPA pursuant to its powers under the
also id. at S12052 (remarks by Sen. Cranston). The Wallop Amendment received strong
bipartisan support.
64. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp.
IV 1980); see Infra notes 108-13 and acccompanying text. See also U.S. CONST., art. IV,

§ 1.
65. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 9, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 653-55, 663
(Supp. IV 1980); see infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976).
67. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 10, 94 Stat. at 3573; see infra notes
118-22 and accompanying text.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
69. H.R. REP. No. 1401, supra note 52, at 21-23; see also infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
70. Compare Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c) (Supp. IV 1980) with UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, § 3(a), 9
U.L.A. at 122 (1979); see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. The jurisdictional
requirements are the most important part of the PKPA. To paraphrase, the major jurisdictional provision in § 1738A(c) provides in part:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the
provisions of this section only if(1) such court has jurisdiction under [State] law ... and (2) one of the following
conditions is met:
(A) such State is or had been the home of the child within six months prior to
the commencement of proceedings;
(B) no other State has jurisdiction and the child has a sufficient connection to
the State so that the best interests of the child can be determined;
(C) the child is physically present in the State and an emergency situation arises
whereby the child is abandoned, mistreated or abused;
(D) other States have declined to exercise custody jurisdiction and it is within
the child's best interests for the State to take jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has maintained jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of this
section.
The 48 states that have adopted the UCCJA already follow the PKPA's jurisdictional requirements. The two remaining states may still follow their own jurisdiction requirements,
but they must also satisfy at least one of the jurisdictional guidelines in § 8(a) for proper
custody jurisdiction.
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commerce clause and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.7 '
Thus, the threshold issue is whether the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is a constitutional exercise of congressional power.
II.

THE

PKPA

AS A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

The constitutionality of the PKPA is analyzed in two parts.
First, it must be shown that the legislative goals further a constitutionally legitimate end.72 Accordingly, support for the PKPA
under the commerce clause, 73 and under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 74 is discussed. Second, if a legitimate end can
be found, then the means chosen-the PKPA itself-must be constitutionally permissible. 5
A. ParentalKidnapping andthe Commerce Clause
Congress' powers under the commerce clause 76 have histori71. Section 7(a) provides in part:
(1) there ... [are] disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation. .. ;
(2) the laws and practices by which the courts... determine their jurisdiction
• . * and the effect to be given the decisions ... of other jurisdictions, are often
inconsistent and conflicting;
(3) those characteristics of the law and practice contribute to . . . seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of children, the disregard of
court orders, excessive relitigation of cases, obtaining of conflicting orders...
and interstate travel and communication that is so expensive and time consuming
as to disrupt ... occupations and commercial activities;
(4) among the results. . . are the failure. . . to give full faith and credit to the
judicial proceedings. . . the deprivation of rights of liberty and property without
due process of law, burdens on commerce. . . and harm to the welfare of children and their parents ....
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a), 94 Stat. at 3568-69.
72. Specifically enumerated congressional powers under the constitution have been
interpreted broadly since the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
316 (1819). In MfcCulloch, the Court construed the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, § 8, clause 18 to include "any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being
confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable." Id.
at 413-14. The now famous test devised by the Court is: "Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Under McCulloch, therefore, Congress
may use any ordinarily appropriate and constitutional means to implement its express
powers.
73. See infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 103-46 and accompanying text.
76. The commerce clause grants to Congress the power "[tlo regulate Commerce...
among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted this clause since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), by holding that
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cally been intepreted broadly, and it is settled that such powers
are plenary.7 7 Congress is not limited to legislating in regard to
commercial-economic activities under the commerce clause: in
Hoke v. United States7" and Caminetti v. United States,79 the

Mann Act's prohibition against transporting women across state
lines for immoral purposes was upheld."0 Years later, the Court

in Heartof Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. UnitedStates,"' and Katzenbach
v. McClung 2 held Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196483 a permissible exercise of the commerce clause power, because discrimination against blacks impeded interstate travel.8 4 Given the
Court's historical willingness to interpret the commerce power
broadly in these and other cases,8 5 it would seem clear that child

abductions are a permissible subject for congressional legislation
pursuant to that power.
The notion that parental child abduction operates within inter-

state commerce is amply supported. Congress concluded that
child custody disputes are increasing in number because of inconsistent state laws and practices.8 6 It then concluded that these confficts lead to parental abduction of children across state lines87 and
"interstate travel and communication that is so expensive and
time consuming as to disrupt. . . occupations and commercial
"[tlhe power of Congress. . .comprehends [activities] within the limits of every State in
the Union, so far as [those activities] may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce
. . .among the several States.'" Id. at 9.
77. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ("power is plenary
and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.' "); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 353 (1903) ("power is plenary,
complete in itself").
78. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
79. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
80. "The principle established by the cases is. . .that Congress has power over transportation 'among the several States'; that the power is complete in itself; and that Congress
...may adopt. . . means ... convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the
quality of police regulations." Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323 (citing Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 215 (1885)).
81. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
82. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
83. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243-46 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(1976)).
84. "Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate
commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong." Heartof
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 257; see also McClung, 379 U.S. at 304.
85. See cases cited at supra note 77.
86. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a)(2), 94 Stat. 3566, 3568; see
supra note 71.
87. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a)(3), 94 Stat. at 3569; see supra
note 71.
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activities.""8 Among the results of these activities are "burdens on
commerce." 9 Since these activities cross state lines and impact
upon interstate commerce, they fall within Congress' power to
regulate.9" Although the legislative history contains no specific
factual findings to support Congress' conclusions, 91 there is sufficient evidence to support these conclusions, and Congress can be
presumed to be aware of this evidence when it enacted the PKPA.
The failure to mandate full faith and credit to child custody
orders was widely criticized, and the drafting of the UCCJA underscored the need for concerted action to rectify the problem of

parental child abduction. Furthermore, statistical evidence indi92
cates that the problem of abduction is widespread and severe.

Given that reservoir of evidence, it is difficult to argue that Congress' action was hasty or uninformed.
B.

The PKPA Under Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment

The PKPA is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power
under the enabling language of section 5 of the fourteenth amend88. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a)(3), 94 Stat. at 3569; see supra
note 71.
89. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a)(4), 94 Stat. at 3569; see supra
note 71.
90. "[T]he determinative test of the exercise of power by Congress under the commerce clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which
concerns more States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest." Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 255 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824)).
91. The PKPA was originally a rider to the proposed Domestic Violence Prevention
and Services Act of 1980. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. Most of the
attention, and therefore, most of the legislative history, focused on the Domestic Violence
Act itself. No detailed factual findings were presented to support the PKPA because there
was little opposition to it. The only significant committee discussion over the PKPA concerned whether interstate parental child abduction should be made a federal crime or
whether the Fugitive Felony Act should be applied. See H.R. REP. No. 1401, supra note
52, at 21. When the Domestic Violence Act was not passed, the PKPA was reintroduced as
a floor amendment to an unrelated bill. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
92. Commentators often use statistics to emphasize the seriousness of child abductions. For example, Hudak states: "For every three marriages solemnized in the United
States each year, one divorce is granted. In some states, the statistics approach one in two.
The most pernicious and tragic aspect of a broken American marriage involving children is
the custody-visitation aftermath." Hudak, supra note 42, at 521. Another commentator
notes: "Parental kidnapping is reaching appalling proportions. Although no precise
figures are available to indicate the number of children annually kidnapped by one of their
parents, conservative estimates place the number at 25,000, while other figures range as
high as 100,000." Note, supra note 1, at 830.
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ment. 93 The Supreme Court has equated congressional power to
enforce the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments (the
Civil War amendments) with congressional power under Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution. 94 Moreover, unlike the fifteenth
amendment95 which, by its language, is limited to racial discrimination, the fourteenth amendment encompasses a myriad of constitutional rights and is not so limited.9 6
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,9 7 the Court expanded these powers
in holding that Congress may make a substantive, independent
determination that discrimination has occurred to support congressional action under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
After Morgan, Congress may outlaw or regulate any fourteenth
amendment violations without a prior judicial determination of
unconstitutionality.98 Therefore, the Court's review is limited to a
determination of whether Congress could reasonably find that the
practice attacked violates a fourteenth amendment guarantee. 99
93. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
94. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966). Although South Carolina dealt specifically with Congress' power under § 2 of the 15th amendment, the holding
also applies to the enabling sections in the 13th and 14th amendments since the language in
all three sections is virtually identical. See also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)
(exploring congressional power under the Civil War amendments, but § 5 of the 14th
amendment in particular). Thus, the enabling section of the individual Civil War amendments allows Congress to enact any appropriate legislation to uphold the 13th, 14th, and
15th amendment guarantees.
95. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged

by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
96. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292-94 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
97. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Morgan, the Court held Congress may prohibit discriminatory New York voter literacy tests which precluded eligibility for Puerto Ricans.
Although Morgan involved a 14th amendment equal protection violation remedied
through § 5, the case did not limit Congress' power to enforce the 13th and 15th
amendments.
98. Id. at 648.
99. The Court emphasizes in Morgan that congressional action under § 5 of the 14th
amendment will be given great deference:
Since Congress undertook to legislate so as to preclude the enforcement of the
state law, and did so in the context of a general appraisal of literacy requirements
for voting to which it brought a specially informed legislative competence, it was
Congress' prerogative to weigh these competing considerations. Here again, it is
enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment
that the application of New York's English literacy requirements. . . constituted
an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 655-56 (citations omitted).
Although the Court has hinted that limits exist upon congressional § 5 powers, these
limits remain vague. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). At issue in Oregon v.
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The PKPA is based on the congressional finding that inconsistent state laws governing child custody disputes deny fourteenth
amendment due process guarantees to the parties involved." °
This substantive determination by Congress is a reasonable conclusion immune from constitutional attack despite the Court's
previous failure to squarely address the problems caused by in-

consistent state child custody orders.101 Since the lack of uniform
state custody jurisdictional standards denies interested parties due

process protection, 10 2 Congress has the power to enact any reasonable regulation, including national jurisdictional standards, to insure that fourteenth amendment guarantees are upheld.
C.

Legitimacy of Means Selected to Prevent Parental
Kidnapping

The PKPA's constitutionality is not ensured merely because it
furthers one of Congress' enumerated powers. The means selected must also be examined because congressional legislation is3
0
permitted only if the means do not violate the Constitution.
The PKPA advances Congress' commerce clause and fourteenth

amendment powers by regulating"

enforcement of child custody

orders. A constitutional issue is raised, however, because the
Mitchell was the constitutionality of the Voting' Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). The most controversial provision was reducing the voting
age from 21 to 18 years of age. Congress determined that persons between 18 and 21 years
of age are denied due process and equal protection if they are denied the right to vote.
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, § 301, 84 Stat. at 318. The Supreme Court, however, has never decided a case involving the constitutional rights of persons in this age
group. Although four opinions joined by eight Justices discuss the impact of Morgan, none
received majority support. The Court decided, 5-4, to uphold the 18 year-old vote for
federal elections only. Four Justices argued that Morgan does not empower Congress to
reduce the voting age in any election. See 400 U.S. at 204-05 (Harlan, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Four other Justices held that Morgan gives Congress full power to
reduce the voting age in all elections. See id. at 248.(Brennan, J., dissenting from the
judgments in part and concurring in the judgments in part). The deciding vote was based
solely on federalism concerns. Id. at 119-24 (opinion of Black, J.). Oregon, therefore, is
inconclusive at best.
100. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(a)(4), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569.
101. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
102. Without uniform state custody jurisdiction standards, a parent can easily obtain a
favorable custody decree in a sister state while the other parent can be denied both an
opportunity to be heard and to enforce an existing custody order. Conservative estimates
place the number at 25,000, while other figures range as high as 100,000. Note, supra note
1, at 830.
103. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); see also supra
note 72.
104. Regulation is defined as: "The act of regulating;. . . Rule of order prescribed by
superior or competent authority relating to action of those under its control. Regulation is
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PKPA regulates a subject which has been traditionally supervised
by the states.

Congressional regulation may, of course, be an unconstitutional exercise of power if it impinges upon state sovereignty; that
is the limitation of NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery.' °5 The National League of Cities holding emphasized that under the tenth
amendment, 0 6 Congress is not free to substitute its determina-

the states in areas of traditional state governmentions for that of
07
functions.'
tal
1. Full Faith and Credit
The PKPA's requirement that states give full faith and
credit' 08 to another state's valid' 0 9 custody orders" 0 is constitutionally permissible. Despite their apparent qualification under
rule of order having the force of law issued by executive authority of government. BLACK'S
LAW DiCTIONARY 1156 (5th ed. 1979).
105. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In NationalLeague of Cities the Court held that the 10th
amendment state sovereignty guarantee exempted the states from complying with the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976). Congress, therefore, cannot compel a
state to pay its employees a federal minimum wage. Citing federalism concerns, the
Supreme Court stated that Congress could not regulate a state's plenary authority over
matters essential to its separate and independent existence. Id. at 840-46; see also Kilberg
& Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Meaning and Impact, 45 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 613 (1977); Note, ConstitutionalLaw--Commerce Clause-TheReaffirmation of State
Sovereignty as a FundamentalTenet of ConstitutionalFederalism-NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 736 (1977). But see Schwartz, National League
of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power andState Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1115 (1978); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Commerce Power Limited to Preserve
States' Role in Federal System, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 15 (1976); cf. National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no restraint based on state
sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitution"); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[C]onstitutional powers [cannot] be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the domestic policy of any State.").
106. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST.

amend. X.

The NationalLeague of Cities majority interpreted the 10th amendment as reserving the
power of state sovereignty to the states. Professor Tribe, however, views this interpretation
as erroneously broad, claiming the 10th amendment only establishes a state's right to control services to its citizens. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism andAfimative Rights to EssentialGovernment Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
107. 426 U.S. at 839.
108. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the... Judicial Proceedings
of every other state. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such... Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ I.
109. A child custody order is valid only if the jurisdictional requirements set forth in
section 8(a) are met. 94 Stat. at 3570; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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the rubric of "judicial proceedings," child custody orders were not
traditionally accorded full faith and credit effect."tI The PKPA's
directive, however, is not a legislative attempt to override present
judicial limitations to child custody orders.' 1 2 Congress has the
express power under the full faith and credit clause to prescribe
the effect to be accorded to a foreign state's valid acts, records and
judicial proceedings. Mandating full faith and credit to child custody orders, although arguably paternal," 3 is constitutionally
proper. Congress, therefore, is merely clarifying and defining the
effect to be given child custody orders under the full faith and
credit clause.
2. FederalParentLocator Service
The expansion of the Federal Parent Locator Service" 14 is also
constitutionally permissible. Congress originally established the
Federal Parent Locator Service to help states locate parents who
110. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. IV
1980) reads in part:
(a) The appropriate authorities of every state shall enforce according to its
terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section,
any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State ...
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child
made by a court of another State if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
Id.
11. See, e.g., Holm v. Shilensky, 388 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1968) (divorce decree if subject
to modification in rendering state, subject to modification elsewhere); Hendrix v. Hendrix,
160 Conn. 98, 273 A.2d 880 (1970) (child support decree if subject to modification in rendering state, subject to modification elsewhere); Currie, supra note 40; Ratner, supra note
40; see also supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
112. The PKPA does not expressly overrule the previously discussed Supreme Court
cases. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text. Congress simply states that the full
faith and credit clause applies to valid custody orders despite the Court's previous avoidance of that result. See infira notes 149-75 and accompanying text. Through the PKPA,
Congress has clarified the full faith and credit clause so that it may be applied without
apprehension. This congressional assurance, however, has not produced positive results.
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
113. The measure is paternal if it is assumed that child custody orders are not granted
proper full faith and credit under the Constitution. Congress seems to be reprimanding the
states for refusing to carry out their constitutional directive:
The judges of the state courts are not only sworn to support the Constitution, like
other state officers, but are bound also to observance of federal law by the special
direction of the supremacy clause. This may on occasion require then, specifically
and affirmatively, to enter a particular judgment as in complying, for example,
with the injunction of the full faith and credit clause . ...
Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 516 (1954).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976).
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had violated child support orders." 5 The PKPA expands the Federal Parent Locator Service so that states may use it similarly to
locate a parent who has abducted a child whether or not a support
order is involved. ' 6 The service is not mandatory and a state can
elect not to participate.' 7 Thus, the expansion of the Federal Parent Locator Service is not a regulation at all. It is simply a congressional attempt to aid states attempting to fight parental child
abductions.
3.

Fugitive Felon Act
Congress' decision to expand the Fugitive Felon Act '

8

is not

constitutionally objectionable. The Act, which makes interstate
flight to avoid prosecution a federal offense, was deemed constitutional."19 It is designed merely to help the states enforce existing
state felony statutes.' 20 The federal statute is invoked only if the
state from which the parent fled with the child has a statute mak-

ing parental abduction a felony.' 2 ' The fleeing parent is deemed a
federal felon by crossing state lines to avoid a state prosecution for
child abduction. The federal statute is not mandatory-states can
decline to use its provisions by not making parental child abduc-

tions a felony.' 22 Expanding the existing Fugitive Felon Act to
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 653 (1976).
116. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 9(b)-(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 655, 663
(Supp. IV 1980).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 653, 654 (1976). A state may use the Parent Locator Service by entering into an agreement with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The state may
then, on the parent's behalf request that the Secretary furnish available information on the
abducting parent's whereabouts.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
119. Lupino v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 363 (D. Minn. 1960), appealdismissed, 285
F.2d 429 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 824 (1961). For a similar conclusion under a
previous Fugitive Felony Act, see Hermans v. Mathews, 6 F.R.D. 3 (D.D.C. 1946); Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1937); United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65
(W.D. Ky. 1936).
120. Middlemas v. District Court. 125 Mont. 310, 283 P.2d 1038 (1951) (purpose of
Federal Fugitive Act is to assist in apprehening fugitives). For a similar analysis under a
previous Fugitive Felony Act, see Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 801, reh g denied, 332 U.S. 821 (1947); United States v. Brandenberg, 144
F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976). "Whoever moves or travels in interstate ... commerce
with intent. . . to avoid prosecution ... under the laws of the place from which he flees,
for a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime. . . which is a felony under the laws of the
place from which the fugitive flees . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976). In addition,
"[v]iolations of this section may be prosecuted only ... upon formal approval in writing
by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General of the United States, which
function of approving prosecutions may not be delegated." 1d.
122. See id.
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encompass parental abductions, therefore, does not violate the
Constitution since it imposes no potentially impermissible duty
upon the states.
4. Jurisdiction
Establishing national standards for proper state child custody
jurisdiction is the final means selected by Congress under the
PKPA. The jurisdictional guidelines set forth in section 8(a) are
virtually identical to those in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.' 2 3 Although the jurisdictional requirements in section
8(a) present no problems for the forty-eight states which have
adopted the UCCJA, z4 constitutional difficulties do arise for the
remaining two states because, along with their own laws defining
child custody jurisdiction, z5 they must satisfy additional requirements to possess proper jurisdiction under the PKPA. 2 6 Full
faith and credit will not be given to any child custody order if the
court issuing that order lacks jurisdiction. The PKPA, therefore,
effectively mandates all fifty states to follow the UCCJA jurisdictional requirements.
There is little doubt that the establishment of national child
custody jurisdictional standards is a regulation of traditionally
state-supervised activities. Domestic relations law, of which child
custody is a part, is within the complete domain of the states. 2 7
The PKPA, however, clearly mandates state compliance to strict
jurisdictional requirements. Unless these requirements are met,
proper state child custody jurisdiction is not satisfied and any custody orders issued by a court in that state are invalid. Establishing national jurisdictional standards as a means to stop parental
child abduction, therefore, is a regulation which arguably impinges upon local, intrastate activities.' 28 Congress may regulate
intrastate activities, however, if the regulation both rationally relates to a constitutional goal and avoids infringement of state
123. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Problems could arise, however, if any
of these 48 states decides to repeal the UCCJA. The jurisdictional requirements of the
PKPA would still force those states effectively to follow the UCCJA.
125. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1)
(Supp. IV 1980).
126. Id. § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
127. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1974); McCarty v. Hollis, 120 F.2d 540,
542 (10th Cir. 1941).
128. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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sovereignty. 129
a. RelationshipBetween Custody Jurisdictionand ChildAbductions. The regulation of intrastate activities is permitted if the activity substantially affects interstate commerce and the regulation
is rationally related to a constitutionally desired goal. 130 Congressional regulation of intrastate activities under the commerce
permissible if the necessary
clause has long been constitutionally
32
13 1
and proper clause is satisfied.'

The issue, therefore, is whether national jurisdictional standards will help reduce interstate child abductions. The answer is
clearly in the affirmative. When the UCCJA was enacted, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
noted that the Act's effectiveness and efficiency depended on
unanimous adoption and use by the states. 133 Commentators emphasized that although the UCCJA is a positive attempt toward
ending child abductions, concerted state action is necessary 134 and
federal legislation essential 135 to finally eliminate parental child
abduction. Since there was a recognized need for uniform state
child custody laws before Congress acted, 136 the selection of national jurisdictional child custody standards as a means to end interstate child abduction is indeed rational, necessary, and proper.
b. Custody Jurisdiction Standards and State Sovereignty.
Mere congressional regulation of a traditional state function is insufficient to render the regulation unconstitutional under the tenth
amendment. 137 Thus, even if the regulation is aimed at the
129. See infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
130. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 118 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 18.
132. Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S.
342, 350-52 (1914); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903) (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
133. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9
U.L.A. at 114.
134. Ehrenzweig, supra note 36; Fleck, supra note 44; Foster & Freed, supra note 42.
135. Bodenheimer, supra note 3; Hudak, supra note 42.
136. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
137. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Hodel involved the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which established uniform
minimum nationwide standards for surface mining. The Court held that the Act was constitutional under the commerce clause. The Court held NationalLeague of Cities inapplicable since only regulated private individuals and businesses were regulated, not the states.
Id. at 286.
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"States as States,"' 13 8 and addresses matters which are unquestion-

ably attributes of state sovereignty, 39 it is constitutionally permissible unless it directly impairs the states' ability to perform
traditional state govenmental functions.' 4 To fail the tenth
amendment test, the regulation must leave the state no choice but
strict compliance in areas which it previously had complete
freedom.
In NationalLeague of Cities, 4 ' direct displacement of state authority over its public employees occurred because the Fair Labor

Standards Act (FLSA) required the states to pay federal minimum
wages to its public employees. The Supreme Court acknowledged
that it was perhaps desirable for state employees to receive federal
minimum wage and overtime benefits, but stated that the burden

placed upon the states to comply with the federal requirements far
outweighed any conceivable benefit. 42 The states' authority to
structure and maintain integral governmental operations as it desired was destroyed because the states were compelled to observe

the same minimum wage standards as private employers. After
characterizing state government operations as an integral part of

state sovereignty, the Court concluded that the FLSA displaced
the states' ability to structure employer-employee relationships,
since states were prevented from hiring employees on the states'
own terms. 143 In addition, the states would be compelled to

choose between increasing revenue to pay present employees the
required wages and reducing the number of employees so that inHodel gave the Court the opportunity to clarify the NationalLeague of Cities holding.
The Hodel Court stated three requirements which must be satisfied before congressional
commerce clause legislation can be invalidated under NationalLeague of Cities:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as
States." Second, the federal legislation must address matters that are indisputably
"attribute[s] of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."
452 U.S. at 287-88 (citing NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854); see also
infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
138. NationalLeague of Cities emphasized that "the States as States stand on quite a
different footing than an individual or corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce." 426 U.S. at 854. When a state rather than an individual or corporation challenges Congress' use of the commerce clause to regulate a particular
activity, therefore, the Court will allow a state greater deference because of the 10th
amendment guarantee.
139. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
142. 425 U.S. at 850.
143. Id. at 851.
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creased revenue would not be needed."' Directly displacing state
autonomy, therefore, violated the tenth amendment.
The PKPA, however, does not abrogate state autonomy because federal regulation of state child custody jurisdiction does

not directly impair the ability of a state to issue or modify child
custody decrees. A state's nonjurisdictional procedural and substantive child custody laws are unaffected if the PKPA's jurisdic-

tional and due process requirements are met. 145 Moreover, even if
economic burden upon the state is determinative of a tenth
amendment violation, the PKPA passes muster.1 46 The imposition of federal jurisdiction standards does not require the states to
spend additional revenue, nor to reorganize their present nonjurisdictional procedural and substantive law to maintain current ex-

penditures. The limit on congressional commerce clause power
expressed in NationalLeague of Cities, therefore, is inapplicable.

The PKPA is not violative of tenth amendment protection because
it does not directly displace the states' independent authority over

child custody laws.
III.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

PREVENTION ACT

After the establishment of the PKPA's constitutionality the essential issue becomes whether it will effectively deter the interstate
abduction of children by their parents.1 47 To date, the PKPA has
been neither applied nor challenged. Thus, to determine its effec-

tiveness, this Note will compare holdings of past Supreme Court
144. Id. at 850.
145. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
146. Although the Court has discounted economic burden upon the states as a basis for
NationalLeagueof Cities,see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264,292 n.33 (1981), it is possible that financial considerations are all that is left of the
decision. In its most recent 10th amendment case, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S.Ct. 1054
(1983), the Court held that extending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
to cover state and local governments does not violate the 10th amendment. National
League of Cities was distinguished because the degree of federal intrusion was "sufficiently

less serious" than in that case, id. at 1062, but it is difficult to believe that requiring the
states to follow federal guidelines in determining when age can be used as a factor in
discharging its employees is any less intrusive than requiring them to follow federal guidelines in determining what to pay its employees. If so, the only significant distinguishable
factor remaining was that the ADEA "will have In]either a direct [n]or an obvious effect on
state finances." Id. at 1063. Moreover, one Justice argued that NationalLeague of Cities
should be reversed. See id. at 1064-68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. Deterring interstate child abductions is one of Congress's stated purposes.
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 7(c)(6), 94 Stat. at 3569.
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cases with holdings which would have resulted if the PKPA had
been in effect.
In Kovacs v. Brewer,14 8 the Supreme Court allowed North
Carolina to redetermine child custody despite an existing custody
order from New York. New York originally granted child custody to the paternal grandfather,'4 9 who subsequently moved with
the child to North Carolina and established residency.150 New
York then modified the custody decree at the mother's request
and awarded custody to her. North Carolina ignored the modification and granted custody to the grandfather.' 5 ' The Supreme
Court conceded that North Carolina need not give the New York
custody order full faith and credit: if changed circumstances necessitated an arrangement different from that decreed by the New
York court, the custody decree would not be res judicata in 52New
York, nor, therefore, binding on the North Carolina court.
The identical Kovacs result survives under the PKPA, but the
rationale is changed. New York's custody modification would not
bind North Carolina notwithstanding a change in circumstances
because jurisdiction is lost once custodian and child establish residency in another state. 53 A subsequent custody challenge, therefore, must originate' 5 4 in the state with valid custody jurisdiction.
In Halvey v. Halvey 115 the parents married and raised a son in
New York. Without the father's consent, the mother took the
child to Florida, established residency, and filed for divorce and
custody there. After the father brought the child back to New
York, Florida granted a divorce and awarded custody to the
mother. The mother filed a writ of habeus corpus in New York
challenging the legality of the father's detention of the child. The
New York court gave custody to the mother, but severely modified the Florida custody order.' 5 6 The Supreme Court held that
"so far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what
148. 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
149. Id. at 605.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 606.
152. Id. at 608.
153. New York does not have jurisdiction because the child no longer lives in New
York. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)
(Supp. IV 1980); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
154. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (Supp.
IV 1980); see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
155. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
156. Id. The New York court granted custody to the mother, and granted visitation
rights to the father plus the right to have the child with him during specified holidays.

1982]

PA.RENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT

Florida could do in modifying the decree New York may do.' 57
The Court in Halvey was concerned that Florida was without
power to render a valid custody decree because the father was not
present nor was evidence presented on his behalf.'5 8 The Court
seemed to imply that either New York or Florida could modify
the original decree once the father presented his side of the

controversy. 159
The PKPA would have eased the Court's dilemma. The Florida court had unquestioned jurisdiction to determine the custody
of the Halvey child since both mother and child had lived in Florida for over six months before the mother filed the divorce and
custody suit.' 60 Since Florida had proper jurisdiction, New York
could not hold simultaneous jurisdiction notwithstanding the father's New York residence.' 6 1 The child's presence in New York
would be irrelevant since the PKPA requires the child to live in
the rendering state for six months.' 62 Because this residency requirement was not satisfied, New York could not render a new
custody order or modify an existing order. Thus, under the
PKPA, the holding in Halvey would be incorrect. The Florida
custody decree would have to be given full faith and credit by the
New York courts.
In May v. Anderson, 6 ' the Supreme Court held that a state
custody decree is invalid unless in personam jurisdiction exists
over both parents. 64 In May, a husband and wife raised three
children in Wisconsin. After marital problems developed, the
wife agreed to take the children with her to Ohio. The father filed
a divorce and custody suit one month later in Wisconsin. The
mother was served through personal delivery of summons and petition pursuant to the Wisconsin divorce statute. When the
mother did not appear, the divorce was granted and custody was
awarded to the father. The children returned to Wisconsin and
lived with their father for four years. During a visit in Ohio, the
157. Id. at 614.
158. Id. at 613.
159. Id. at 614.

160. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
161. Since the PKPA, like the UCCJA, adopts the established home principle to child
custody jurisdiction, simultaneous jurisdiction in different states is precluded.
162. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A)
(Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
163. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
164. Id. at 533.
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mother refused to surrender the children. The father then sought
to enforce the Wisconsin custody decree in Ohio. 65
The Supreme Court believed that in personam jurisdiction
over the mother, regardless of the children's legal domicile, was a
prerequisite for a valid custody order. 6 6 Wisconsin could not
have proper custody jurisdiction without personal jurisdiction
over the father, notwithstanding the children's legal residence in
Wisconsin. The Court, therefore, held the Wisconsin custody de167
cree invalid because Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction.
Under the PKPA, Wisconsin would have jurisdiction to determine custody because the children resided there six months prior
to the custody suit. Moreover, the children stayed with their
mother in Ohio less than six months before returning to Wisconsin under a valid custody order. Finally, the children remained in
Wisconsin with their father for four years before the custody dis168
pute arose.
Under section 8(a) of the PKPA, only Wisconsin would have
proper jurisdiction. 169 The Wisconsin custody order would be
valid and enforceable in Ohio because the children were Wisconsin residents for well over the requisite six-month period. Under
the PKLPA, lack of personal jurisdiction over the mother is irrele70
vant in determining proper custody jurisdiction.
In Ford v. Ford,'7 ' a Virginia court granted a divorce and dismissed the custody suit when the husband and wife reached a mutual custody agreement. The father had custody of the children
during the school year; the mother had custody during summer
vacation. The mother and children moved to South Carolina,
where she was granted custody of the children. The father objected, but the Supreme Court held that South Carolina was not
bound by Virginia's dismissal order since it was not a final judg72
ment in Virginia. 1
165. Id.
166. Id. at 533.

167. Id. at 534.
168. Id. at 530-31.
169. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) (Supp. IV
1980); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
170. The PKPA is primarily concerned with the welfare of children suddenly caught in
the turmoil of their parents' divorce. The established home principle to jurisdiction in the
PKPA emphasizes the child's residence rather than the parents'. The focus, therefore, is on
the child's connection with the state and not the state's connection with the battling parents.
Ratner, supra note 39, at 815-23.
171. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
172. Id. at 192, 193. The Court suggests that the dismissal order might have been bind-
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The PKPA would disallow the Ford result, notwithstanding
the unenforceability of a voluntary custody agreement.' 7 3 South
Carolina simply would not have jurisdiction to modify the Virginia custody arrangement. Virginia would continue to have jurisdiction because the children were visiting their mother in South
Carolina only during the summer months. Thus, they would not
be residents of South Carolina for more than six months. 174 Only
Virginia, therefore, would have jurisdiction to modify the custody
decree and the South Carolina custody modification would be
clearly invalid.
Webb v.Webb,175 illustrates another jurisdictional aspect of
the PKPA. The father took the child to Georgia, notwithstanding
the existence of a valid Florida custody order, when he learned
that the child was left without adult supervision for one weekend.
After a Georgia court granted custody to the father, the mother
filed suit, arguing that Georgia must give full faith and credit to
the Florida custody decree. The Supreme Court found that it
lacked jurisdiction since the mother failed to raise her claim

properly. 176
The Webb decision came six months after the PKPA was enacted; however, the Court evaded the full faith and credit issue on
a mere technicality of pleading. Under the PKPA, the result
would hinge simply on whether the father justifiably removed the
child from Florida. If an emergency situation warrants the father's actions, the Georgia court has jurisdiction to determine custody notwithstanding the Florida judgment. 7 7 If the father's
ing if the Virginia trial judge had thoroughly investigated the propriety of the parents'
private agreement. Id. at 194.
173. "'Custody determination' means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court
providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary
orders, and initial orders and modifications." Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980

§ 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
174. Under § 1738A(c)(2)(A) the child must reside in the state six months prior to filing

of a custody suit. In addition, § 1738A(c)(2)(E) allows a state to maintain custody jurisdiction by continuing to satisfy one of the other provisions in § 1738A(c)(2)(A)-(D).
175. 451 U.S. 493 (1981). This case also calls into question the UCCJA's ability to
prevent parental child kidnappings. The kidnapping occurred after both Georgia and
Florida had enacted the UCCJA. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A.
Supp. at 15 (1983).
176. Although the mother had made reference to "full faith and credit," she nowhere
cited the federal Constitution, nor was the existence of any federal question asserted. Id. at

495-96.
177. A state has proper jurisdiction under § 1738A(c)(2)(C) if the child is physically
present in the state and has been abandoned, mistreated or abused. This provision would
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actions were not justifiable, Georgia would lack jurisdiction and
the Florida decree would stand.
In sum, the PKPA is effective. Its provisions clearly state the
requirements for jurisdiction over a custody dispute. If these requirements are not met, the state lacks jurisiction 78 and must give
full faith and credit to any previous custody order validly issued
by a sister state.' 79 Randomly issued or modified child custody
orders are avoided. The PKPA will undoubtedly reduce child abductions since parents will be unable to obtain hasty and ill-considered custody orders in another state. At the same time, it
recognizes the need for custody modifications for changed or
emergency circumstances.'8 0 The PKPA, therefore, permits cus18
tody modification when it is in the children's best interests. '
IV.

CONCLUSION

Commentators have long suggested federal legislation to resolve interstate child custody disputes. 82 Supreme Court decisions merely underscored the confusion surrounding the legal
effect of child custody orders. 1 83 Moreover, the UCCJA was not
completely effective. 184
The PKPA seeks to deter parental child abductions by promoting cooperation among the states regarding child custody orders. 8 5 By establishing national standards, the PKPA determines
whether a state possesses adequate jurisdiction to render or modify a child custody order.'8 6 The PKPA also directs states to give
full faith and credit to valid foreign state custody decrees. 8 7 Finally, the PKPA expands the Federal Parent Locator Service' 88
have allowed the Georgia court in Webb to exercise custody jurisdiction if a pending emergency had prompted the father's actions. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
178. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (Supp.
IV 1980).
179. Id. § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
180. Id. § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1980); see also supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
181. Cf Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)
(Supp. IV 1980) (jurisdictional requirements of section 8(a) are tailored to serve child's best
interests; modification provisions incorporate those requirements).
182. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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and the Fugitive Felon Act.' 8 9 Both of those measures aid the
states in their individual fight against parental child abductions.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is a constitutional
exercise of congressional power under Article I, section 8, and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 90 Thus, the Supreme Court
should readily apply the statute since it sets clear guidelines for
interstate child custody disputes. Finally, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is an effective solution to a pressing problem.
The PKPA prohibits randomly issued or modified child custody
orders' 9' and should reduce child abductions by parents wishing
to obtain favorable out-of-state custody orders. The PKPA's fundamental purposes, therefore, is fulfilled.
MARIAN

C.

189. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 73-146 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 147-81 and accompanying text.
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